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Abstract
Commodity markets are characterized by large volumes of forward contracts as well as high
volatility. They are often accused of weak competitive pressure. This article extends the
existing literature by analyzing tacit collusion of rms, forward trading and volatility simulta-
neously.
The expected collusive prot may depart from the monopoly outcome in a volatile market
(Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). Introducing forward trading enables rms to gain the ex-
pected monopoly prot for a broader range of parameters. In contrast to a deterministic
market (Liski and Montero, 2006), trading forward in a volatile market may lead to an ex-
pected collusive prot below the monopoly one.
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1. Introduction
Commodity markets and especially the power market are often accused of oligopolistic mar-
ket structures and weak competitive pressure. Among others, the following common market
characteristics seam to be central: Few competitors due to high entry costs, a large market
share that is sold either in long-term contracts or on future markets and a large volatility on
the demand as well as on the supply side.
Stochastic inuences play a crucial role in the power market and are one of the main reasons for
trading forward. Thus, a volatile market context is added to the existing economic literature
in order to gain a deeper insight into forward trading and collusion of rms. In gure 1 the
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Figure 1: ELIX Day Base (black) and ELIX Day Peak(red line) for the second quarter 2013
European Electricity Index (ELIX) is illustrated for the second quarter of 2013. The ELIX is
calculated by the Leipzig European-Energy-Exchange on the basis of the aggregated bid/oer
curves of all EPEX Spot market areas. Thus, "the ELIX is a fundamental reference price for
the common European market. It corresponds to the market price which would be determined
in a market environment without bottlenecks" (European-Energy-Exchange, 2010). The red
line plots the daily average value for peakload (ELIX Day Peak) and the black line the daily
average for baseload (ELIX Day base). Obviously volatility plays a crucial role in the Euro-
pean power market, since e.g. in the second quarter of 2013 the price for one megawatt hour
uctuated regularly been between e 10 and about e 50. In the second quarter of 2013 the
absolute bottom was reached on June 16 with a price of e -17,29 for baseload and a price
of e -36,72 for peakload whereas the absolute peak was reached on April 8 with a price of
e 68,07 for baseload and price of e 78,19 for peakload.
In table 1, volumes for dierent commodities traded at the Leipzig European-Energy-Exchange
in 2009 and 2010 are presented, using data from the annual report of European-Energy-
Exchange (2010). Spot market, forward market, total market volume as well as the ratio of
forward traded volume and total market volume for power and natural gas are displayed in
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terrawatt-hours (TwH) and gigawatt-hours (GwH) respectively. The column Forwards m.share
shows the ratio between forward contracted volume and total market volume (spot and for-
ward market volume). Obviously for both commodities, most of the trading takes place on
the forward market, since the market share of forwards exceeds 0.65 for all commodities and
years. This illustrates the importance of trading forward on both markets.
Of course, there are important other reasons than collusive behavior for forward trading in
Spot m. Forward m. Total m. Forwards m.share
Commodity 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
Power (TwH) 203 279 1025 1208 1228 1487 0,83 0,81
Gas (GwH) 3516 15026 11361 31863 14877 46889 0,76 0,68
Table 1: Commodity volumes traded at European-Energy-Exchange (2010)
these markets, e.g. risk sharing. However, the common eect of large forward traded amounts,
volatility and (tacit) collusion of rms deserves a closer look.
Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Villa (1993) were the rst, who introduced forward trading in
industrial organization and analyzed its strategic aspects. Liski and Montero (2006) point out
the eect of forward trading on (tacit) collusion of rms. They model an innitely repeated
oligopoly game where rms are allowed to act on the spot as well as on the forward market.
They show under a deterministic demand and supply structure that forward trading has a
stabilizing eect on a collusive agreement and does not alter the collusive prot. Thus, in a
deterministic market structure forward contracts can be used to stabilize a collusive agreement
without any disadvantage for the involved rms. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) analyzed the
eect of volatility on the collusive strategy when rms solely interact on the spot market
and calculated that stochastic market conditions make collusive agreements harder to sustain.
The contribution of this article is the connection of the ndings of Liski and Montero (2006)
and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) by analyzing the eects of forward trading on collusive
agreements in volatile markets.
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The intuition behind the eect of forward trading on collusion is as follows: Firms x a certain
quantity at a certain price via forward trading. This induces two eects: On one hand it de-
creases the demand available for a deviating rm. Here, the consequence of forward trading is
pro-collusive. On the other hand, forward trading decreases the demand available for collusive
price-setting. Here, the consequence of forward trading is contra-collusive. Liski and Montero
(2006) and Green and Coq (2010) show in a deterministic model that especially short-term
forward contracts are suitable to stabilize collusive agreements. As will be shown in this paper
trading short-term forward contracts strictly promotes collusion in volatile markets, as well.
However, as will be pointed out in the upcoming analysis, trading forward more contracts than
the respective monopoly quantity decreases the prots of colluding rms. This is a problem
for colluding rms in a volatile market, especially when demand and cost parameters are con-
tinuously distributed, since rms cannot avoid having involuntarily contracted more than the
corresponding monopoly quantity. This "over-contracting"leads to a decrease of the spot and
forward market price and of the expected collusive prot.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2.1 the main assumptions of the model
and some general remarks are presented. Then in section 2.2 the eects of forward trading on
a collusive agreement are modeled for a volatile market structure. In section 2.3 each rm's
expected prot from forward trading is derived for any probability density function. Then an
exponential distribution is used to show the prot decreasing eect of forward trading. Section
2.4 incorporates the possibility for rms to trade forward contracts, while setting a price below
monopoly price. The properties of such a semi-collusive strategy are modeled for a two state
distribution of cost and demand parameters. Section 3 concludes.
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2. The model
2.1. Assumptions and general remarks
Collusive behavior of rms can occur if and only if there is no incentive for any rm to deviate
from the collusive agreement unilaterally. If the net present value of prots gained by collusion
is greater than or equal to the net present value of prots gained by ending collusion, no
incentive for any rm to break the collusive agreement unilaterally exists.
The exact outcome of prices, quantities and prots is stochastic and depends on the dierence
between the reservation price (a) and marginal costs (c). I do not distinguish between demand
and supply shocks. The dierence between the reservation price and marginal costs,  = a c
will be denoted spread in the analysis. Whenever I use monopoly prices, quantities and prots
for the argumentation, I refer to monopoly prices, quantities and prots for a given realization
of the stochastic dierence between reservation price and marginal costs. As shown by Liski
and Montero (2006, p. 226) assuming a linear demand function is possible without loss of
generality. I denote the price, quantity and prot associated with the one-period monopoly
solution by pm = a+c
2
, qm = a c
2
and m = (a c)
2
4
.
The spot and the forward market are connected similar to the deterministic model of Liski and
Montero (2006): In the rst period, both rms simultaneously choose the amount of forward
contracts they want to trade (forward market period). In the second period, contracts are
settled and rms choose the amount they want additionally to sell on the spot market (spot
market period). This structure of a forward market, that is directly followed by a spot market
is indenitely repeated.
In order to ensure comparability with pure spot market super games (e.g. Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986), Friedman (1971) and Tirole (1988)), there is no discounting between a con-
secutive forward and spot market. Discounting only takes place between two spot markets
or two forward markets. One can think of rms deciding around Christmas each year about
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forward contracts to be delivered in the following year. See Liski and Montero (2006, p.217)
for a more detailed discussion about discounting.
Firms compete in prices and sell a homogenous product, which seems a valid assumption es-
pecially for the power market. Whenever rm i sets a price lower than its competitor j rm i
meets the whole spot market demand. When prices are equal, rms split the market equally.
The trigger strategy played by each rm can be characterized as follows: As long as both
rms have set the (semi-)collusive price psc and have contracted forward the (semi-)collusive
amount of Fsc, each rm sets the (semi-)collusive price psc on the spot market and on the
forward market each rm sells the (semi-)collusive quantity forward Fsc. When at least one
rm has deviated from the (semi-)collusive price and forward quantity, the competitor sets a
price equal to marginal cost on the spot market and sells any arbitrarily amount forward. This
can be seen as the grim trigger strategy for games, where rms are allowed to trade on a spot
as well as on a forward market, analogous to the spot market grim trigger strategy analyzed
by Friedman (1971). See Liski and Montero (2006, p.218) for more details.
In general, two possibilities of deviation exist. Firstly, setting a price lower than the collusive
price in the spot market. Secondly, increasing the forward sales in the forward market. The
latter is never protable as speculators, which take the counterpart, immediately realize any
deviation from collusion in the forward market and are not willing to pay any price higher than
the next period's stock market price, which is given by marginal costs. This restricts protable
deviation to the spot market and a deviating rms knows the actual state of the economy.
The demand that can be achieved on the spot market for a deviating rm is restricted by
already sold future contracts. Each rm has a secured supply of fi. The secured supply of
both rms is given by F = fi+ fj. Total traded amount decreases accessible demand (a F
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instead of a). This gives the (residual) demand function on the spot market:
DRi =
8>>><>>>:
(a  F   pi) if pi < pj;
1
2
(a  F   pi) if pi = pj;
0 if pi > pj
(1)
2.2. Eects of forward trading on the stability of a collusive agreement
A rm deviating from collusion maximizes its prot over its (deviation) price. This leads to
the following optimal deviation price and quantity:
max
p
i = (pi   c) (a  F   pi)
pd =
1
2
[a+ c  F ] ; qd = 1
2
(a  F   c) ;d = 1
4
[a  c  F ]2
(2)
Deviation price, quantity and prot are quite similar to price, quantity and prot in a deviation
from collusion without forward trading. However, the already contracted amount decreases
the demand that is reachable on the spot market and quantity and prot become smaller.
When the total contracted amount exceeds or equals the Bertrand quantity (qB), which is
given by twice monopoly quantity (F  qB = 2qm = a  c), no positive deviation prot can
be earned since any deviation would require a price that is lower than the Bertrand price on
the spot market, which is given by marginal costs. As described in section 2.1 deviation yields
zero prots in all following forward and spot market periods. Therefore, the net present value
of deviation is given solely by the deterministic deviation prot of this single period:
ENPV [Deviation] =
8<:14 [a  c  F ]
2 if F < 2qm
0 if F  2qm;
(3)
The demand that can be reached by collusive behavior in this period is restricted by already
sold forward contracts,too. As long as rms are able to fully-collude they set monopoly prices
behaving as if no forward trading had occurred (pm = a c
2
instead of pm = a F c
2
). If
they would not do so, they would not be able to sell collusive forward contracts at expected
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(monopoly) prices as speculators would anticipate the (expected) price discount on the spot
market (see section 2.4 for a collusive price below the monopoly price). When rms set this
collusive price, they split residual demand given by DR = a F pm and earn a per-unit-prot
of C = pm   c and each rms' collusive prot on the spot market can be stated as:
C =
1
2
DRC =
1
2
(a  F   pm) (pm   c)
=
1
8
2   1
4
F =
1
2

1
4
 
2   2F + F 2  1
4
F 2

=
1
2

1
4
(a  c  F )2   1
4
F 2

=
1
2
d   1
8
F 2
(4)
Whenever the total forward traded amount does not exceed or equal monopoly quantity (F <
qm), collusive behavior leads to collusive prots in this period. Additionally collusive prots
given by half of the expected monopoly prot are expected in all upcoming periods.
Whenever the total forward traded amount exceeds or equals monopoly quantity (F  qm)
no collusive prots can be earned in this period, since the total demand for the monopoly
price is already satised. However, not deviating from collusion promises half of the expected
monopoly prot in all upcoming periods. This denes the net present value of collusion as:
ENPV [Collusion] =
8<:12d   18F 2 + 12 1 E[m] if F < qm1
2

1 E[
m] if qm  F < 2qm
(5)
The dierent collusive prots in the period of (possible) deviation lead to two scenarios. In
the rst scenario (I), the total forward traded amount is less than the monopoly quantity
(F < qm). In the second scenario (II), the total forward traded amount exceeds monopoly
quantity (qm < F ). A rm that is involved in an (explicit or tacit) collusive agreement with
its competitor has two alternative strategies. Firstly, it can collude and gain a prot in the
corresponding period and in future periods. Secondly, it can deviate and gain an additional
prot in the corresponding period but forgo all collusive prots in future periods. A rm
chooses the strategy yielding the highest expected net present value of prots. Comparing
the net present values leads to an inequality, which represents the trade-o between collusion
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and deviation. This inequality is used to nd the critical discount factor, that is applied in
supergames to measure the stability of non-cooperative collusive behavior.
Scenario I: The monopoly quantity exceeds the total forward traded amount (F < qC)
For a stable collusive agreement, the net present value of collusion must be larger than the
net present value of deviation. Hence, the forward traded amount is below collusive quantity
and the following no deviation constraint has to be fullled for a stable collusive agreement:
ENPV [Deviation]  ENPV [Collusion]
1
4
(a  F   c)2  1
2
(a  F   p) (p  c) + 
1  E

Ci
 (6)
Inserting the monopoly price and prot gives the critical discount factor for full-collusion and
a forward traded amount below monopoly quantity, that is given in Proposition 2.1.
Scenario II: The total forward traded amount exceeds the collusive quantity (qC < F )
In scenario II no collusive prots are earned on the spot market, since the total forward traded
amount exceeds monopoly quantity (qm < F ). Hence, the net present value of collusion is
restricted to half of the future expected monopoly prots. For the forward traded amount
exceeding monopoly quantity this gives following no deviation constraint for a stable collusion:
ENPV [Deviation]  ENPV [Collusion]
1
4
(a  F   c)2  1
2

1  E[
m]
(7)
Rearranging again yields the critical discount factor for fully-collusive behavior and an forward
traded amount above the corresponding monopoly quantity, that is given in proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1. The critical discount factor for any forward traded amount under full-
collusion is given by:
 =
8>>><>>>:
1  E[]2+V ar[]
E[]2+V ar[]+2 2F+2F 2 if F < q
m
1  E[]2+V ar[]
E[]2+V ar[]+22 4F+2F 2 if q
m  F < 2qm
(8)
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See equation A.5 and equation A.6 in the Appendix for a detailed derivation.
Eects of forward trading on the critical discount factor
In the following I will analyze how the critical discount factor is inuenced by the realization of
the random dierence between reservation price and marginal costs (), the amount of forward
contracts (F), the expected dierence between reservation price and marginal cost (E []) and
the variance of the dierence between reservation price and marginal cost (V ar []).
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor with respect to the dierence between
reservation price and marginal costs is given by:
@
@
=
8>>>><>>>>:
2 [ F ][E[]+V ar[]]
[E[]2+V ar[]+2 2F+2F 2]2
 0 if F < qm
4
[ F ][E[]2+V ar[]]
[E[]2+V ar[]+22 4F+2F 2]2
 0 if qm  F < 2qm
(9)
A higher dierence between reservation price and marginal costs leads to a higher prot leading
to a higher critical discount factor, because deviation becomes more attractive.
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor due to forward contracts is given by:
@
@F
=
8>>>><>>>>:
 2 [ 2F ][E[]
2+V ar[]]
[E[]2+V ar[]+2 2F+2F 2]2
 0 if F < qm
  4 [ F ][E[]
2+V ar[]]
[E[]2+V ar[]+22 4F+2F 2]2
 0 if qm  F < 2qm
(10)
A higher forward contracted amount strictly reduces the critical discount factor, since for
forward traded amounts less than the monopoly quantity (0  F < qm) the deviation prot
is cut more sharply than the collusive prot in the corresponding period. This is derived
analytically in the Appendix (equations A.1 - A.4). If the forward traded amount is larger
than the monopoly quantity (qm  F ), no collusive prot can be earned in the actual period.
Thus, only the deviation prot is reduced and forward contracts strictly promote collusion.
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor with respect to the expected dierence
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between reservation price and marginal costs is given by:
@
@E []
=
8>>>><>>>>:
 2 [
2 2F+2F 2]E[]
[E[]2+V ar[]+2 2F+2F 2]2
 0 if F < qm
 2 [2
2 4F+2F 2]E[]
[E[]2+V ar[]+22 4F+2F 2]2
 0 if qm  F < 2qm
(11)
A higher expected dierence of reservation price and marginal costs decreases the critical dis-
count factor. Deviation from collusion becomes less attractive. A higher expected dierence
increases future collusive prots which cannot be earned after a deviation. Hence, the addi-
tional prots earned by deviating become smaller in relative terms.
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor with respect to the variance of the dier-
ence between reservation price and marginal costs is given by:
@
@V ar []
=
8>>>><>>>>:
  2 2F+2F 2
[E[]2+V ar[]+2 2F+2F 2]2
 0 if F < qm
  22 4F+2F 2
[E[]2+V ar[]+22 4F+2F 2]2
 0 if qm  F < 2qm
(12)
A higher variance of the dierence of reservation price and marginal costs decreases the critical
discount factor. At a rst glance this seems to be counter-intuitive since uctuations are said
to threaten collusions. One should keep in mind the relationship between variance squared,
expectation and expectation squared used above (E [2] = E []2 + V ar []). As can be
seen, expected prot given by 1
4
E [2] ceteris paribus increases by an increasing variance. As
presented above, a higher expected prot increases the stability of collusion. Thus, it is not
the variance itself that decreases the stability of an collusive agreement, but more precisely
the appearance of a high realization of the random dierence between reservation price and
marginal costs. For a higher variance, this high realization of the random variable is more
likely to be drawn. However, for a given realization of the random variable, a higher variance
decreases the critical discount factor. Table 2 summarizes these partial eects on the critical
discount factor.
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Figure 2 shows the evolution of the critical discount factor due to forward contracts and due
I II
Variable Partial Eect Monopoly quantity Contracts exceeding
exceeding contracts monopoly quantity
Spread @

@
+ +
Forwards @

@F
* *
Expected spread @

@E[]
* *
Variance of spread @

@V ar[]
* *
Table 2: Summary of partial eects on the stability of a collusive agreement. Note: A higher critical discount
factor implies a lower stability
to the ratio of boom and expected prots. The discount factor is plotted for positive ratios
of contracted amount and monopoly quantity. Neither collusive nor deviation prots can be
earned for a higher amount of contracts than the Bertrand quantity and the critical discount
factors becomes zero. Hence, the graph starts at a ratio of the forward traded amount and
monopoly quantity of zero and stops at a ratio of two. It is known from Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986) that deviation from collusion is more protable in booms. The graph in gure
2 starts at a ratio of prot over the expected prot of 1, since in booms per denition prots
are higher than the expected ones. It ends in this dimension at a prot that is ten times the
expected one.
The horizontal front-line of gure 2 shows the evolution of the discount factor for expected
prot equal to actual prot

2
E[2]+V ar[]
= 1

. This represents the case of certainty described
by Liski and Montero (2006), since without any forward contracts and without any volatility
the critical discount factor is one half and when total monopoly quantity is traded forward
the discount factor is one-third. For forward contracts between these two extreme cases
(0  F
qm
< 1), the critical discount factor strictly decreases in forward contracts. When rms
have contracted more than the monopoly quantity of the corresponding state (scenario II),
the critical discount factor still decreases in forward contracts. In scenario II the critical
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Figure 2: Eects of forward trading and ratio of boom and expected prot on discount factor
discount factor decreases more rapidly than in scenario I, since in scenario II forward trading
solely cuts the deviation prot, whereas in scenario I it cuts the deviation prot as well as the
collusive prot.
Introducing a volatile market creates an incentive to deviate from collusion during booms.
Without forward contracts (F = 0) the critical discount factor strictly increases and converges
to one for boom prots increasing to innity. The functional form of the critical discount factor
depends on the ratio of boom and expected prot and is given by 
2
E[2]+V ar[]+2
= 0  ,
which is equivalent to the ndings of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). When contracts are
traded forward and at the same time boom prots are larger than expected prots, the evolution
of the critical discount factor described above does not change fundamentally. Other things
being equal, a higher amount of contracts decreases the critical discount factor, whereas boom
prots exceeding expected prot increase the critical discount factor. This is shown graphically
in gure 2 by the evolution of the plane between the above described front-lines. When rms
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contract a suciently high quantity, stable collusion becomes possible for any discount factor.
2.3. Eects of forward trading on the protability of a collusive agreement
Proposition 2.2. When rms set a collusive price, for which spot market quantity exceeds
the forward traded amount, rms prot is not altered by the forward traded amount:
SCi =
1
2
(a  p) (p  c) 8 F < (a  p) (13)
The prot of colluding rms, that trade a certain amount forward has two sources: Firstly, the
prot coming selling production on the spot market. Secondly, the prot coming from selling
production on the spot market. As long as the forward traded amount does not exceed the
collusive quantity, the spot market prot for colluding rms is given by equation 4. Inserting
an an arbitrarily collusive price leads to collusive spot market prot of:
SMi =
1
2
 
a  pSM  pSM   c  1
2
F
 
pSM   c 8 F < (a  p) (14)
The prot on the forward market is given by each rms forward traded amount multiplied by
the dierence of the forward price and the marginal costs. As mentioned before, the forward
market price is given by the anticipated spot market price, since speculators build rational
expectations. Thus, the expected prot on the forward market is given by the expected
dierence of the spot market price and marginal costs times each rms forward traded amount
FMi =
1
2
F
 
pFM   c = 1
2
F
 
pSM   c 8 F  (a  p) (15)
The total (semi-)collusive prot for a rm is given by the spot and the forward market prot:
SCi =
1
2
 
a  pSM  pSM   c  1
2
F
 
pSM   c+ 1
2
FE

pSM   c
=
1
2
 
a  pSM  pSM   c 8 F < (a  p) (16)
Thus, the increase of the expected forward market prot from forward trading is totally oset
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by a decrease of the expected spot market prot. Therefore, as long as forward traded amount
does not exceed the spot market quantity, rms prot is not changed by forward trading
Proposition 2.3. When rms set a collusive price, for which the forward traded amount
exceeds spot market quantity, forward traded amount decreases rms prot:
SCi =
1
2
 
2qmF   F 2 8 F > (a  p) (17)
When rms set a price, for which the already forward traded amount exceeds the spot market
quantity, that is associated with this price, rms cannot sell any unit on the spot market.
Speculators always supply the total forward traded amount to the market, since by assumption
they cannot store the commodity. Hence, the price on the spot market is given by psm = a F ,
which is below the monopoly price (pSM = a   F < pm = 1
2
(a   c)) and colluding rms do
not earn any prot on the spot market. However, both rms earn a prot from the amount
that they have traded forward. Thus, when rms have traded forward an amount above the
amount, that is associated with their price on the spot market, the prot is solely given by the
prot from forward trading:
SCi =
1
2
F (pSM   F ) = 1
2
F (a  F   c) = 1
2
 
2qmF   F 2 8 F  (a  p) (18)
Proposition 2.4. For any distribution function each rms expected total collusive prot can
be stated as:
E[sci ] =
1
2

E

2qmF   F 2 j F > (a  p)+ E [(a  p) (p  c) j F  (a  p)] (19)
The total collusive prot for each rm is given by the prot, when the total forward traded
amount does not exceed the quantity sold by rms on the spot market as well as the prot,
when rms set a price, for which the already forward traded amount exceeds the spot market
quantity. Combining prots of Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.3 leads to Proposition 2.4.
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Proposition 2.5. The prot function for an exponential distributed spread and rms that
always set the monopoly price is
E [i] =
1
2
F

  1
2
F 2 +
1
4
1
2
e 2F (20)
This prot is found by calculating the prot in Proposition 2.4 for the exponential distribution.
See equation A.9 in the Appendix for the detailed derivation. The eect of forward trading on
the expected collusive prot can be analyzed by taking the rst and second order derivatives
with respect to the forward traded amount:
@E [i]
@F
=
1
2
1


1  e 2F   F < 0 8 F > 0
@2E [i]
@F 2
=  1 + e 2F < 0 8 F > 0
(21)
Thus, the total expected prot for colluding rms is concavely decreasing in the contracted
amount. When for example colluding rms trade the total expected monopoly quantity forward
(F = 1
2
1

), they earn only about 87% of the prot compared to a situation where rms do not
trade any forward contracts, since :
E

ijF = 12

E [ijF = 0] =
1
2
+ e 1  0:8679 (22)
Figure 3 shows the collusive prot for rms depending on the forward traded amount, when
they could sustain a full collusion at any price ( ! 1). Figure 3 shows the expected collusive
per period prot for an expected monopoly quantity of E [qm] = 1
2
, E [qm] = 2
3
and E [qm] = 1,
since for an exponentially distributed spread the expected monopoly quantity is E [qm] = 1
2
1

.
For moderate amounts traded forward the prot decreasing eect of forward trading is rather
small mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, when rms only trade a moderate amount forward, the
probability, that the forward traded amount exceeds the collusive monopoly quantity is rather
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Figure 3: Eect of the forward traded amount on the collusive prot for  ! 1
small. Secondly, even if the forward traded amount exceeds the collusive monopoly quantity,
only rather small monopoly prots on the spot market are crowded out by forward trading.
Higher realizations of the random dierence between the reservation price and marginal costs,
which contribute much more to the expected prot, are not aected. The opposite is true
for excessive amounts traded forward. Then, it becomes rather likely that the forward traded
amount exceeds the monopoly quantity and even relatively large realizations of the spread
are aected. This illustrates the fundamental nding that is in contrast to the deterministic
market conditions modeled by Liski and Montero (2006): Stabilizing a collusive agreement
using forward contracts is costly in volatile markets.
Proposition 2.6. If rms have (involuntarily) traded forward an amount above half prohibitive
price (F < 1
2
a), it is protable to buy back own production. However, as long as rms face
marginal costs this prot is below half monopoly prot, since:
E [i] =
1
2
F (a  F   c) < 1
2

1
4
a2   Fc

 1
2

1
4
(a  c)2

8 F > 1
2
a (23)
When rms buy back their own production they do not gain any prot on the spot market.
Quite the opposite, they bear the cost of buying back their production. This cost is given by
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the amount rms buy back (F   ~x) times the price associated with the amount, that is left
for consumers (p(~x) = a  ~x).
On the forward market rms benet from buying back production, since this increases the
forward price to pFM = a  ~x. Therefore, the prot of buying back own production is:
i =
1
2
[F (a  ~x  c)  (F   ~x) (a  ~x)]
=  ~x2 + ~xa  Fc
(24)
As easily can be seen, the optimal amount left for consumers is given by ~x = 1
2
a, since
the marginal can be seen as sunk costs. The prot associated with this amount is given by
i
 = 1
8
a2  1
2
Fc. See equation A.11 and A.12 in the Appendix for the comparison of prots.
One might think, that it could be protable to increase production to ~x = 1
2
a, when the
forward traded amount is below (F < ~x). This is not protable, since marginal cost cannot
be seen as sunk costs any more. and restricting the amount available for consumers to ~x = 1
2
a
is protable if and only if forward traded amount exceeds this amount (F > 1
2
a).
However, especially on the electricity market there is a huge direct cost of buying back own
production, since storage or disposal are not that easy. The missing possibility of (protable)
storage or disposal is a severe problem on the european energy market, which even leads
sometimes to negative prices. Therefore, this possibility is not analyzed more detailed.
2.4. Forward trading and the optimal semi-collusive strategy
Proposition 2.7. Each rms expected collusive prot is given exactly by half of the expected
monopoly prot (E[i] =
1
2

MR + (1  )MB

) as long as their discount factor is above
the threshold discount factor of:
 >  = 1  
M
B (1  ) + MR
MB (2  ) + MR   qMR qMB + 12qMR
2 (25)
See equation A.7 Appendix for a detailed derivation.
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The critical discount factor for full-collusion without forward trading (0) ("Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986) or Tirole (1988) style"') is above the critical discount factor with forward
trading, since
0 = 1  
M
B (1  ) + MR
MR + (2  )MB
> 1  
M
B (1  ) + MR
MB (2  ) + MR   qMR qMB + 12qMR
2 = 
 (26)
For a two state distribution the recessive amount is exactly known. A forward traded amount
less or equal the recession monopoly quantity stabilizes collusion, but is not altering the
prot. Thus, for a discrete distribution colluding rms can trade up to this recessive monopoly
quantity forward, without altering the expected prot. This is in contrast to the ndings for
an exponential distribution in section 2.3, where the recessive monopoly amount can be any
positive real number and rms are always in danger of "over-contracting".
Proposition 2.8. When colluding rms trade forward an amount that is above the monopoly
quantity in recession, the expected collusive prot for a two-state distribution is given by:
E

SCi

=
1
2


 
2qMR F   F 2

+ (1  )  aB   p  p  cB < 1
2
E

M
 8 F > qMR
(27)
Proposition 2.8 follows straightforward from Proposition 2.4, since for a two state distribution
with probability  a recession and with probability 1   a boom occurs. Thus, the expected
recession prot is given by 
 
2qMR F   F 2

, since rms have traded forward an higher amount
than the corresponding monopoly quantity. However, the expected boom prot remains unaf-
fected and is given by (1  )  aB   p  p  cB:
E[sci ] =
1
2

E

2qmF   F 2 j F > (a  p)+ E [(a  p) (p  c) j F  (a  p)]
=
1
2


 
2qmF   F 2+ (1  ) (a  p) (p  c) (28)
Proposition 2.9. When rms cannot collude by contracting the total recessive quantity for-
ward, rms adopt their price in boom as well as sell more than the recessive monopoly quantity
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forward. The the optimal boom price (psc) and forward traded amount (Fsc) is:
Fsc = q
M
R +
1
2
1  

(a  2p+ c) @p
@F
> qMR 8 p < pMB
psc = p
M
B  

1  
 
F   qMR
 @F
@p
< pMB 8 F > qMR
Firms will choose the forward traded amount F and the boom price p, such that they maximize
the expected collusive prot. Unfortunately, optimization of the expected collusive prot such
that the no deviation constraint holds, cannot be solved analytically. Therefore, the total
dierential is used to show the structure of optimal collusive design.
When rms cannot fully-collude, rms choose price and forward traded quantity exactly to
match the no deviation constraint (C
!
= 0). The partial eect of the semi-collusive price on
the forward traded amount is: (For derivation see equation A.13 to A.20 in the Appendix.)
@p
@F
=
(a  F   p)(1  ) + 2(qMR   F )
(1  )F   (1  )(a  2p+ c) > 0
@F
@p
=
(1  )F   (1  )(a  2p+ c)
(a  F   p)(1  ) + 2(qMR   F )
> 0
(29)
For the upcoming analysis, the most important factor for this partial eect are:
@p
@F
> 0;
@F
@p
> 0;
@ @F
@p
@
> 0;
@ @p
@F
@
< 0 (30)
Maximizing the expected collusive prot due to the forward traded amount leads to:
@E[]
@F
= 
 
2qMR   2F

+ (1  )

(a+ c)
@p
@F
  2p @p
@F

!
= 0
Fsc = q
M
R +
1
2
1  

(a  2p+ c) @p
@F
> qMR 8 p < pMB
(31)
Maximizing the expected collusive prot due to the boom price leads to:
@E[]
@p
= 

2qMR
@F
@p
  2F @F
@p

+ (1  ) (a  2p+ c) != 0
psc = p
M
B  

1  
 
F   qMR
 @F
@p
< pMB 8 F > qMR
(32)
As long as semi-colluding rms set a price below the monopoly boom price, they choose
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an forward traded amount above recessive monopoly quantity and vice versa (psc < p
M
B ,
Fsc > q
M
R ). Therefore, in recession as well as in booms the optimal strategy departs from the
monopoly outcome.
The eect of the recession probability  on the semi-collusive outcome is given by the deriva-
tives of the optimal semi-collusive price and forward traded amount with respect to the reces-
sion probability 
@Fsc
@
= (a  2p+ c)
"
  1
(1  )2
@p
@F
+
1  

@ @p
@F
@
#
< 0
@psc
@
=   F   qMR 
"
1
(1  )2
@F
@p
+

1  
@ @F
@p
@
#
< 0
(33)
For a given discount factor, that forces rms to semi-collude, rms can either trade forward
more than the corresponding recession monopoly quantity or set a boom price below the
monopoly one. Ceteris paribus a higher recession probability  leads to an lower forward
traded amount as well as to a lower collusive boom price. This means rms stabilize their
collusive agreement rather by adopting boom price than by trading forward. Quite the opposite
is true, when the probability for a boom 1    is increased. Then rms trade a rather large
amount forward but are reluctant to adopt boom price.
The economic intuition of this result is straight forward: Semi-colluding rms have to choose
whether they sacrice an larger amount of boom or of recession prot. When the expected
recession prot increases, they prefer sacricing more of the boom prot. When in contrast
the expected boom prot increases, rms prefer sacricing more of the recession prot.
3. Conclusion
Uncertainty, volatility and uctuations are the most frequent reasons given for forward trading.
The contribution of this paper is the simultaneous analysis of uctuations and forward contracts
on collusive agreements. The incorporation of stochastic market conditions leads to a more
21
precise understanding of the eects of forward trading and collusion. In terms of the economic
literature, the gap between Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Liski and Montero (2006) has
been closed.
The rst part answers the question, whether forward trading can be used in volatile markets to
stabilize a collusive agreement. Therefore, the critical discount factor has been determined and
the partial derivatives of the critical discount factor were analyzed. Main ndings are: High
realizations of the random dierence between reservation price and marginal costs (spread)
have a destabilizing eect, whereas a higher expectation of the spread has a stabilizing eect
on collusive agreements. The results are totally in line with the analysis of Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986). However, decomposition of the expectation of the squared spread into its
squared expectation and variance led to an interesting insight: For a given positive uctuation
(boom), a higher variance increases the stability of collusion, since a higher variance makes
a boom more common. Hence, it is not the variance itself that decreases the stability of a
collusive agreement in volatile markets, but rather the appearance of high realizations of the
spread that destabilizes collusive agreements. However, extraordinary booms only occur if
the distribution of the spread is characterized by a sucient degree of dispersion. As a further
insight we found that short term forward contracts can be used by rms to strictly stabilize
collusion. This is in line with the analysis of Liski and Montero (2006) and Green and Coq
(2010).
The second part answers the question, how the expected collusive prot is inuenced by forward
trading. For deterministic market conditions the prot that is earned by colluding rms, is not
at all inuenced by the forward traded amount (Liski and Montero, 2006). As shown in this
article for continuous distributed cost and demand parameters the expected prot earned by
colluding rms strictly decreases in the forward traded amount. When rms trade forward on
a volatile market, they do not know in advance the demand and cost structure they will face
at the date of delivery. For colluding rms this always leads to the problem of involuntarily
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having contracted more or less than the optimal collusive amount. When rms have contracted
less than the optimal collusive amount, colluding rms can sell an additional amount on the
spot market, which gives them the possibility to share the monopoly prot. However, for
rather small contract volumes (in relation to the total accessible demand) a deviation could
become protable for "impatient rms". When rms have contracted more than the optimal
collusive amount, solely the speculators decide about the price on the spot market, which
leads to a lower price. This lowers forward price, since the forward price is determined on the
basis of rational expectations. As a consequence, the expected prot from trading forward
a certain amount is beneath the expected prot from selling the same amount on the spot
market. Therefore, the total expected value of the prot for each colluding rm is decreased
by forward trading. The more forward contracts are sold, the more severe is the reduction of
collusive prot by (additional) forward contracts.
The third part describes for a two-state distribution of cost and demand parameters the optimal
semi-collusive strategy. Semi-colluding rms choose a forward traded amount above recession
monopoly quantity and a boom price below the monopoly price. Therefore, neither in recession
nor in boom the monopoly outcome is generated.
The three main result of this article can be stated as follows: Firstly, forward contracts can
be used in deterministic as well as in volatile markets to stabilize a collusive agreement.
Secondly, in volatile markets forward trading decreases the expected total prot of colluding
rms, when they "involuntarily" trade forward an amount above the recession quantity. For
a discrete distribution, the lowest recession quantity is known. Therefore, this is not a severe
problem for colluding rms. When in contrast to this for a continuous distribution the lowest
recession monopoly quantity is not known, rms expected prot is strictly decreasing in forward
contracts. Thirdly, semi-colluding rms will generate neither in boom nor in recession the
monopoly outcome.
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4. Appendix
4.1. Properties of the prot for a deviating and a collusive rm
Deviation prot (equation 2) can be rearranged to
d =
1
4
[a  c  F ]2 = 1
4

(a  c)2   2F (a  c) + F 2
= m

1  F1
2
(a  c) +
1
4
F 2
1
4
(a  c)2

= m

1  1
2
F
qm
2 (A.1)
Collusive prot in a spot market period (equation 4) can be brought to:
Remember: Collusive prot in a spot market period can be earned if and only if F < qm
C =
1
2

1
4
(a  c)2   1
2
F (a  c)

=
1
2

m   2
4
(a  c)2 F
a  c

=
1
2
m

1  F
qm
 (A.2)
As can easily be seen , deviation prot as well as collusive prot in a spot market period is
decreased by forward contracts. However, as long as the total amount of forward contracts is
less then the monopoly quantity, the decreasing eect is stronger on deviation prot. This is
due to the fact that forward trading inuences deviation prot squared (D = m
h
1  1
2
F
qm
i2
)
whereas collusive prot is inuenced linearly (C = 1
2
m
h
1  F
qm
i
).
Partial derivatives of collusion and deviation prot in a spot market period are given by:
@C
@F
=  1
2
m
qm
;
@D
@F
=  
m
qm

1  1
2
F
qm

(A.3)
Comparing both partial derivatives leads to
 1
2
m
qm
  
m
qm

1  1
2
F
qm

=) qm  F (A.4)
If the forward traded amount is less than the respecting monopoly quantity (F < qm), addi-
tional forward contracts decrease deviation prot more sharply than collusive prot.
If the forward traded amount is greater than the respective monopoly quantity (F > qm),
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no collusive prots in the corresponding period can be earned. Additional forward contracts
decrease deviation prot. Hence, the eect of additional forward contracts on the critical
discount factor increases.
4.2. No deviation constraint and critical discount factor
Derivation of the critical discount factor (Proposition2.1). To nd the critical discount factor,
the no deviation constraint (equation 6), which represents the trade-o between collusion and
deviation, is solved for the discount factor . As long as rms trade less than the monopoly
quantity forward, the critical discount factor is given by:
NPV (Collusion)  NPV (Deviation)
d  1
2
d   1
8
F 2 +
1
2

1  E[
m]
4d + F 2  
1  E[
2]
2   2F + 2F 2  
1  

E[]2 + V ar []

  
2   2F + 2F 2
E[]2 + V ar [] + 2   2F + 2F 2 = 1 
E[]2 + V ar []
E[]2 + V ar [] + 2   2F + 2F 2
(A.5)
When rms trade more than the monopoly quantity forward, the no deviation constraint in
equation 7 has to hold and the critical discount factor is given by:
NPV (Collusion)  NPV (Deviation)
1
4
(a  F   c)2  1
2

1  E[
m]
22   4F + 2F 2  
1  

E []2 + V ar []

  2
2   4F + 2F 2
E []2 + V ar [] + 22   4F + 2F 2 = 1 
E []2 + V ar []
E []2 + V ar [] + 22   4F + 2F 2
(A.6)
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Inserting the two state distribution function into the no deviation constraint (equation A.5):
1
4
2   1
2
F +
1
2
F 2  
1  E

M

MB   qMB F +
1
2
F 2  
1  

MR + (1  )MB

  
M
B   FqMB + 12F 2
MR + (1  )MB +MB   FqMB + 12F 2
  1  
M
R + (1  )MB
MR + (2  )MB   qMR qMB + 12qMR
2
(A.7)
Where the last line comes from the fact, that the highest forward traded amount without a
loss in (recession) prot is given by recession monopoly quantity (F = qMR ).
4.3. Using the exponential distribution to specify the total expected prot
An exponential distribution for the spread ( = a c) is introduced into the expected collusive
prot (Proposition 2.4), to derive the total expected collusive prot in Proposition 2.5. Note:
As long as the forward traded amount does not exceed the monopoly quantity, each rm earns
half monopoly boom prot (1
2
M = 1
8
(a   c)2 = 1
8
2), since they set the monopoly price.
When the forward traded amount exceeds monopoly quantity, they solely earn a prot from
forward trading of 1
2
F (2qmF   F 2) = 1
2
F ((a  c)F   F 2) = 1
2
F (F   F 2)
E[sci ] =
1
2

E

2qmF   F 2 j F > 1
2
(a  c)

+ E

1
8
(a  c)2j F  1
2
(a  c)

=
1
2
Z 2F
0
 
F   F 2 bf()d + Z 1
2F
1
4
2 bf()d
=
1
2
F
Z 2F
0
 bf()d| {z }
A
  1
2
F 2 bF (2F )| {z }
B
+
1
8
Z 1
2F
2 bf()d| {z }
C
(A.8)
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A, B and C can be brought to:
A =
1
2
F
Z 2F
0
e d =
1
2
F

 2F 1

e 2F + 0 +
1

Z 2F
0
e d

=  F 2e 2F + 1
2
F


1  e 2F
B =  1
2
F 2

1  e 2F
C =
1
8

Z 1
2F
2e 2Fd =
1
8


1

4F 2e 2F + 2
1

Z 1
2F
e d

=
1
2
F 2e 2F +
1
4

1

e 2F2F +
1

Z 1
2F
e d

=
1
2
F 2e 2F +
1
2
F

e 2F +
1
4
1
2
e 2F
(A.9)
Summing up the rst (A), the second (B) and the third part (C) yields:
E [i] =  F 2e 2F + 1
2
F


1  e 2F  1
2
F 2

1  e 2F+ 1
2
F 2e 2F +
1
2
F

e 2F
+
1
4
1
2
e 2F =
1
2
F

  1
2
F 2 +
1
4
1
2
e 2F
(A.10)
4.4. Prots of buying back own production
As long as rms bear marginal costs, rms prot, when buying back their own production is
below the monopoly prot, since:
BuyBacki <
1
2
Mi
1
2

1
4
a2   Fc

<
1
8
(a  c)2
1
2
a  F < 1
4
8F > 1
2
a
(A.11)
When rms do not buy back any production, their prot is given by i =
1
2
F (a F   c), this
prot is below the prot when buying back own production, since:
1
2
i
 =
1
8
a2   1
2
Fc >
1
2
F (a  F   c)
1
4
a2   Fa+ F 2 > 0 F1;2 = a
+
 
p
a2   a2
2
=
1
2
a
(A.12)
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4.5. Derivation of the optimal semi-collusive strategy
When rms trade more than the recessive monopoly quantity forward, the no deviation con-
straint looks as follows:
1
4
(a  F   c)2  1
2
(a  F   p)(p  c) + 1
2

1  

(2qMR F   F 2) + (1  ) (a  p)(p  c)

0   1
2
(a  F   c)2 + (a  F   p) (p  c) + 
1  


 
2qMR F   F 2

+ (1  ) (a  p) (p  c)
C :=  1
2
(a  F   c)2 + (a  p) (p  c) 1  
1     F (p  c) +

1  
 
2qMR F   F 2
 !
= 0
(A.13)
Firms that collude and need to adopt forward traded amount above the recessive monopoly
quantity and/or set a price in booms below monopoly price, choose the contracted amount
and the price exactly to match no deviation constraint.
Lowering the boom price stabilizes a collusive agreement, if and only if the partial derivative
according to the price is negative (@C
@p
< 0):
@C
@p
= (a  2p+ c) 1  
1     F < 0
p >
1
2
(a+ c)  F 1  
1  
(A.14)
The partial derivative of the constraint according to the price is negative for all prices above
the residual monopoly price (@C
@p
 0 8 p  1
2
(a  F   c)), as long as:
1  
1   >
1
2
,  < 1
2   (A.15)
This condition is fullled for any discount factor, that forces rms to semi-collude (see equation
26 for the condition of semi-collusion without forward trading), since:
1
2   > 
0 =
MB
MR + (2  )MB

2  
M
R +
M
B > 
M
B )

2  
M
R > 0
(A.16)
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Selling an higher amount than the recessive monopoly quantity forward, stabilizes a collusive
agreement, if and only if the partial derivative according to forward contracts is positive
(@C
@F
> 0):
@C
@F
= (a  F   c)  (p  c) + 
1  
 
2qMR   2F

> 0
(1  ) (a  p)
1  (1  2) +
2
1  (1  2)q
M
R > F
(A.17)
The rst part of the condition is given by a factor depending on the discount factor and the
recession probability multiplied with the boom quantity ( (1 )(a p)
1 (1 2) ). The second part is given
by a factor depending on the discount factor and the recession probability multiplied with the
recession quantity ( 2
1 (1 2)q
M
R ). This condition is fullled for forward traded quantities that
do not "exceed too much" the recessive collusive quantity. If the condition had been negative,
rms exactly choose F = (1 )(a p)
1 (1 2) +
2
1 (1 2)q
M
R , since a higher amount would decrease the
stability of a collusive agreement and simultaneously decrease the prot.
To identify the partial eect of the forward traded amount and the boom price the total
dierential of the no deviation constraint is used.
@F
@p
=  
@C
@p
@C
@F
=
(1  )F   (1  )(a  2p+ c)
(a  F   p)(1  ) + 2(qMR   F )
> 0
@p
@F
=  
@C
@F
@C
@p
=
(a  F   p)(1  ) + 2(qMR   F )
(1  )F   (1  )(a  2p+ c) > 0
(A.18)
This leads to following optimal forward traded amount and boom price:
Fsc = q
M
R +
1
2
1  

(a  2p+ c)(a  F   p)(1  ) + 2(q
M
R   F )
(1  )F   (1  )(a  2p+ c) > q
M
R
psc = p
M
B  

1  (F   q
M
R )
(1  )F   (1  )(a  2p+ c)
(a  F   p)(1  ) + 2(qMR   F )
< pMB
(A.19)
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The partial derivatives of the relationship between forward traded amount and semi-collusive
boom price with respect to recession probability  are:
@p
@F
@
=
2
 
qMR   F

((1  )F   (1  )(a  2p+ c))   (a  2p+ c)  (a  F   p)(1  ) + 2(qMR   F )
((1  )F   (1  )(a  2p+ c))2 < 0
@F
@p
@
=
 (a  2p+ c)  (a  F   p)(1  ) + 2(qMR   F )  2 qMR   F  ((1  )F   (1  )(a  2p+ c)) 
(a  F   p)(1  ) + 2(qMR   F )
2 > 0
(A.20)
Where the signs can easily be deducted from the fact that, the forward traded amount exceeds
recessive monopoly quantity F > qMR and the fact that (1  )F   (1  )(a  2p+ c) > 0
(see equation A.14) and (a  F   p)(1  ) + 2(qMR   F ) > 0 (see equation A.17)
4.6. Negligible uncertainty as a special case
Under certainty, rms never trade more than the monopoly quantity in a full collusive agree-
ment, since trading forward more than (a priori known) monopoly quantity would decrease
prots. Total traded amount is given by summing up the single (symmetrically) traded amount
where x gives the proportion of monopoly quantity that is traded forward (F = fi + fj =
2f = xqm = 1
2
x). Under certainty, the spread equals its expectation and the variance of
the spread is equal to zero. Then the critical discount factor (equation A.5) can be brought
to:
   = 1  E []
2 + V []
E []2 + V [] + 2   2F + 2F 2 = 1 
2
22   x2 + 1
2
x22
= 1  2
(2  x)2 + 2x;
@
@x
=
 4 [1  x]
(2  x)2 + 2x  0
(A.21)
The partial derivative of the critical discount factor due to proportion of monopoly quantity
traded forward is strictly negative. Hence, in a deterministic market structure, trading forward
is able to stabilize collusive agreements as well. The critical discount factor neglecting uncer-
tainty (equation A.21) is equivalent to the factor found by Liski and Montero (2006, p.219).
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Representation of the critical discount factor used for plotting in gure 2:
 = 1  E []
2 + V ar []
E []2 + V ar [] + 2   2F + 2F 2
= 1  2
2 + 
2
E[]2+V ar[]
h
2  2 F1
2

+ F
2
1
4
2
i = 1  2
2 + 
2
E[]2+V ar[]
h
2  2 F
qm
+ F
2
qm2
i (A.22)
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